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Care in 
Trinity: 
 
A Paradigm for 
Pastoral Care 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Aims and methodology 
 
‘Care in Trinity’ examines the implications of a relational model of the Trinitarian 
doctrine of God for a contemporary paradigm for pastoral care. It explores why and 
how the Trinity can provide a definition of pastoral care for the purposes of 
identifying, planning and evaluating it.  
 
*If a working definition of theology is ‘the methodological effort to understand and 
interpret the truth of revelation'1 then a definition of applied theology might be the 
work of applying ‘the methodological effort to understand and interpret the truth of 
revelation’ to the practical needs of people. Any theological effort to understand is 
contextual, and contemporary theologians would seem to be better placed than others 
to articulate the questions that underlie the concerns of their generation. It therefore 
seems reasonable to expect contemporary theologians to be particularly well placed to 
contribute to contemporary applied theology, and so for the present project I have 
deliberately reflected upon contemporary thought wherever possible in the discussion. 
 
My research has taken the basic form of a literature survey plus reflection and it grew 
after the manner of a collage. Its principle aim was to draw several interests in the 
subject together into a correlation, and to use this as a basis from which to draw 
conclusions concerning the nature of pastoral care. 
 
* My understanding of this ‘correlational’ approach to theology is based on the work 
of David Tracy and others, as developed by Don Browning in the service of defining 
fundamental practical theology.2 This sees Christian theology as ‘a critical dialogue 
between the implicit questions and the explicit answers of the Christian classics and 
the explicit questions and implicit answers of contemporary cultural experiences and 
practices.’(p46). It also follows a contemporary trend to employ a ‘dialogical 
principle’, which has been defined elsewhere as one in which ‘truth is never the 
product of a single monological voice but emerges out of the interplay of a plurality of 
voices’.3  The result is envisaged as an applied version of Christian truth after the 
manner of a mutual relation with intimate connection (i.e. a correlation).  
 
*The foregoing definition of a correlation is valuable in that it indicates provisionality 
about the end result of the process. If a correlation is a mutual relation then 
presumably it can be adjusted or broken and re-formed in much the same way as any 
relation can.  However, some relations are really quite durable, and the term 
‘correlation’ is sometimes used in theology in such a way as to suggest a practical 
usefulness and durability that might be better called an ‘alloy’. Used in scientific 
description an alloy is a blend of chemical elements which ends up having its own 
properties. It is the product of a manufacturing process combining two or more raw 
materials.  Its properties may subsequently be compared and contrasted with those of 
                                                          
1 O’Collins and Farrugia, 1991:240. 
2 Browning, 1991. 
3 Pattison, 1995:2-4.  On contempoarary use of this principle see Selvanayagah, 1998. 
other alloys, and it may possibly even be further combined with them. It is my hope 
that my investigations here produce a working tool for use in pastoral care that has the 
properties of an alloy. An alloy which might possibly be correlated with the results of 
a similar exercise from the starting-point of a quite different theology of God, thus 
contributing to interfaith dialogue and to a more ‘inclusive’ paradigm for pastoral 
care. 
 
*As I understand it, a correlational approach in applied theology requires the 
theologian to monitor the cultural development of new questions, or new versions of 
old questions in order that the discipline may be enabled to address real issues. When 
new questions and concerns present themselves it becomes incumbent upon the 
theologian to seek new or revised correlations. These can be expected to bear the 
stamp of the former ones by virtue of their shared relation to the Christian classics but 
also to be better vehicles for the application of Christian truth in the new cultural 
situation.  
 
*Situatedness. 
 
Mary Grey advises that ‘one of the most important lessons we have learnt in feminist 
theology is to be clear from what context we speak and pose our questions’4. The 
relevance of this project to my own situation is obvious, given that the study has been 
undertaken as part of my ordination training. It has also been influenced by my desire 
to ‘do theology’5 in a manner that can be judged feminist (by which I mean it will 
promote the full humanity of women as well as men).  It has also been influenced by 
my gender, social situation and training in several branches of human care.6 My 
situatedness no doubt bears on the fact that I have chosen to work with a model of 
God described by a feminist theologian, and on my preference for conclusions that do 
not employ specifically religious language, and so might in theory be generalised to 
inform all caring situations. 
 
My initial need was to allow the emergence of an understanding of divine relations 
capable of informing the human relationship of pastoral care. This meant correlating 
divine and human relations. The search for a description of divine relations in the 
Christian tradition required me to pay attention to the history of the development of 
the doctrine of the Trinity. For reasons of time and space I confined my investigation 
of human relations to the intra-personal and the inter-personal as experienced in 
pastoral counselling. It was my hope that in choosing to ‘begin’ with God I would not 
be hindering the contribution of the human sciences. My choice to begin thus 
indicates my desire to contribute to the on-going development of Western 
Christianity, in which the doctrine of the Trinity is a touchstone of orthodoxy.7 It is 
                                                          
4 Grey, 1993:43.   
5 Green, 1990. 
6 E.g., nursing, counselling and group analysis. 
7 On the East-West split over this doctrine see British Council of Churches [hereafter, BCC], 1989, vol. 
2, pp37-40. 
my hope that the discussion will contribute to contemporary phronesis8, or ‘practical 
wisdom’ within the discipline of practical theology. 
 
Epistemology. 
 
The decision to employ contemporary knowledge has led me to seek throughout to 
operate from the basis of a postmodern epistemology. This is not to ignore critique of 
ideological postmodernism9, nor to imply that a postmodern pastoral theology may 
not be flawed. I do, however, disagree strongly with critics who appear to read a 
preconceived negative definition of postmodernism as ‘ethical non-realism’ into 
current attempts to re-conceive pastoral theology in postmodern terms.10  
 
When I use the term ‘postmodern’ I am not speaking about ‘a laid-back pluralism of 
styles and a vague desire to have done with the pretensions of high modernist culture’, 
as it is described in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy.11 I am using it as a signifier 
for the contemporary cultural departure from a foundational approach to questions of 
truth. As I understand it, in the postmodern imagination truth is not seen as 
foundational, or as relative, but rather as contextual, local and plural. 
 
*Understood in this way I regard postmodernism as having the potential to open 
exciting new doors for theology.  Graham says that ‘theorists of gender have turned 
increasingly to ‘postmodern’ strategies for critical tools to guide their enquiries’12, 
and my research here suggests the value of applying similar tools to the study of 
Christian doctrine, especially the doctrine of the Trinity.  Nonetheless, I would not 
want to see the contribution of the new culture operating in an ‘either-or’ manner, in a 
way that disavowed the contribution of other cultures to contemporary questions.13 
Nor would I want to see it degenerating into word games, such as those that are 
currently being played with linguistic theory in some contemporary theology.14 I 
would like to see it being ‘mined’ for what the approach has to offer the ongoing 
development of Christianity.  
 
*To that end I am particularly interested in the light postmodernism throws on the 
function of doctrine. It seems to me that to claim that doctrine is applicable to lived 
experience is akin to understanding truth as contextual, local and plural, for lived 
experience is necessarily contextual, local and plural. It may be that that people will 
                                                          
8 Browning, 1991:38-42. 
9 E.g. O’Neil, 1995 and Graham, 1995:31. 
10 E.g. Nigel Biggar’s critique of Elaine Graham’s pastoral theology (Biggar, 1998:23,22: Graham, 
1996).  See also O’Neil, 1995. 
11 Honderich (Ed.), 1995:708. 
12 Graham, 1995:31. 
13 Ref. Badham, 1998. 
14 E.g. Cupitt, 1990.  
gain a greater respect for doctrine when they see theologians adopting more ‘truly’ 
postmodern approaches than we tend to see in much Christian discourse. 
 
*By a ‘truly’ postmodern approach I am assuming that we do not mistake 
postmodernism for relativism.  Local, plural contexts are not exclusively relative. 
They can be interpreted differently but their existence is not dependent upon their 
interpretation, even while they themselves are subtly altered by it over time. This 
gives them a foundational quality in addition to the relative quality suggested by their 
plurality.15  
 
*I propose that by adopting this ideological stance I able to proceed methodologically 
by means of a ‘fractured foundationalism’, a kind of middle ground between 
relativism and foundationalism. This does not argue with the existence of a material 
objective reality ‘out there’, independent of individual constructions of it. However it 
does refuse to hold that truth is independent of those constructions. In my opinion this 
links the ideological and the material without collapsing one into the other, in a way 
that serves applied theology well.   
 
The above is one way of describing the epistemological ‘feminist standpoint position’ 
first mooted by Elizabeth Grosz but developed for use by the secular sociologist, Lis 
Stanley.16  This position can be summed up in the claim that ‘…there are truths which 
speak to the existence of different, overlapping, but not co-terminus material 
realities’.17  I will be referring to this claim later. For now I propose that a 
diagrammatic representation of this epistemology might look like Fig 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  A diagrammatic representation of Stanley’s ‘Feminist Standpoint 
Position’ using ideational shapes for different material realities. 18 
 
 
Language and feminist concerns. 
 
It has long been accepted that ‘following in the footsteps of Heidegger and above all 
of Wittgenstein, we have seen that we can pause in front of language as before any 
                                                          
15  
16 Stanley, Lis, 1990. 
17 Stanley, 1990:41 (italics mine). 
18 Stanley, Lis, 1990. 
other object… and try to discover what it is, and the nature of its structure’. This is to 
be done by means of a ‘construction or re-construction of a linguistic model by means 
of which we can catch, as if in net, as much as possible of the reality of a language 
whose fluidity cannot be contained’.19 It is acknowledgement of that fluidity that 
allows me to point to the gendered nature of much of the English language and 
question the contemporary appropriateness of continuing to use language that is 
gendered in theological discourse about God.  
 
*To question the appropriateness of using gendered language is not to imagine that 
gender does not influence the way we think, for gender is part of our situatedness and 
hence informs the way we interpret the world.20 It is rather to recognise that the use of 
gendered language to refer to that which has no gender has a conditioning influence 
upon the way we think. When, for example, the term ‘men’ is used to denote a group 
of males and females, but the term ‘women’ cannot be similarly used, the effect is to 
draw attention to the particular relevance of the inclusion of males to the subject being 
discussed. This heightened attention gives the impression that male interests and male 
contributions are more relevant and valuable in the discourse that is employing the 
language. 
 
*In this context, I feel the acknowledgement of feminist concerns about language in 
studies such as ‘The Forgotten Trinity’21 only begins to scratch at the surface of what 
some theologians call the BOM-FOG problem.22 BOM-FOG is shorthand for 
‘Brotherhood Of Man and Fatherhood Of God’ and is used to refer to the use of 
exclusively male analogues for humanity and divinity. The problematic effect of this 
use of language on our understanding is, of course, obscured by centuries’ use of 
these terms, yet it is important to recognise it in for any search for a paradigm of care 
to be truly contemporary. I will therefore in due course follow Wren’s example and 
ask ‘what language shall I borrow?’23 This is in line with my desire to incorporate a 
contemporary understanding of the effect of language in general in this discourse.  
 
To illustrate what I mean by a contemporary understanding of the effect of language I 
will use Stubbs’ diagrammatic representation in Fig. 2 below of three ways of 
understanding the nature of language.24  This is particularly useful because it suggests 
three ways in which religious language may be considered to represent truth. The first 
line in the diagram illustrates the kind of approach that holds that our language is a 
perfect representation of the reality out there. The second is based on a more modern, 
and supposedly scientific doubt about the ability of any language (or truth-claim) to 
do this.  Rather it implies that our language is only ever an imperfect reflection of 
                                                          
19 Aranguren, 1967:37 (italics original). 
20 Graham, 1995 
21 BCC, 1989, Volume 1, p39. 
22 Used in internet debates and by the current membership of the Wiley Seminar in the Religions and 
Theology Department at Manchester University.  
23 Wren, 1989.   See also Ruether, 1983. 
24 Stubbs, 1996:25. 
reality out there – that we have to keep trying to discover the truth. The third line 
takes an entirely postmodern approach. It illustrates the contention that reality is 
shaped by language – that the world is not discovered but ‘created’ by signification.25 
 
* I do not feel it is ultimately reasonable to prefer one of these three approaches to the 
exclusion of the other two. Using terms that are used in the foregoing epistemology, 
they appear to me to be merely different, and ‘not co-terminus’ ways of thinking 
about language.  They are also overlapping contributors in the search for an adequate 
understanding of the relationship between language and reality, each with merit for 
particular usage. The differences in their potential usage could be illustrated by 
choosing to think of the different shapes in Fig 1 as symbolic of the three ways of 
thinking about language, rather than presenting them as representations of three 
different ‘material realities’ (see Fig 3). In other words, choosing to see all three 
linguistic philosophies (which roughly equate to pre-modern, modern and post-
modern understandings) as valuable to the task of theological description of ‘material 
realities’ or truths. 
 
 
Reality   Language 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our language is a 
perfect 
representation of 
reality out there 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Our language is an 
imperfect 
representation of 
reality out there – we 
have to keep trying 
to discover the truth 
 
                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reality out there is 
shaped by language 
– the world is not 
discovered but 
‘created’ by 
signification. 
 
Fig. 2. Possible relationships between language and reality.26 
 
 
 
 
Our language is a perfect representation of reality out there = 
 
 
                                                          
25 See Cupitt, 1990. 
26 Stubbs, 1996:27. 
 
 
Our language is an imperfect representation of reality out there – 
we have to keep trying to discover the truth   = 
 
 
 
 
 
Reality out there is shaped by language – the world is not 
discovered but ‘created’ by signification   = 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Three possible understandings of the relationship between language and 
reality represented as shapes that appear in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Notwithstanding the discussion above the more important point for the present 
concern is that to fail to appreciate the postmodern approach to how language ‘works’ 
is to refuse to recognise its power to conform reality to its inherent politics.  One 
needs to appreciate the creative power of words. Not to do so is to hinder the 
theological task, and to make idols out of words. 
 
If we are prepared to take the postmodern view seriously then we will appreciate the 
likelihood that if words being used to denote for the Supreme Being are uni-gendered 
analogues they will inform the ‘construction’ of a superior sex.  Jann Clanton’s 
chapter, ‘If God Can Include Three Persons, Can’t God Include Two Genders?’ is of 
particular relevance here because it addresses this problem in the light of the early 
heresies concerning the Trinity.27 So is the increasing use among feminist theologians 
of the term Godde for God.  This term makes neither a patriarchal (God28) nor a 
matriarchal (Goddess) claim for Godde – in other words, it ‘constructs’ a view of God 
as neither male nor female - without removing the possibility of addressing Godde in 
terms of either sex in specific circumstances.29  
 
*It is, of course, possible to think of Christianity as a self-regulative total system not 
dissimilar from a language that merely needs to be learnt, as in Lindbeck’s ‘cultural-
linguistic’ approach to the nature of doctrine.30 This approach would favour the idea 
that the analogues currently in use for the Three Persons of the Trinity should be 
regarded as fixed symbols. However to adopt this view would be to define reality in 
                                                          
27 Clanton, 1990:55-65. 
28  
29Reference internet postings on the: feminist-theology@mailbase.ac.uk.  e.g. Matthews, 1999. 
30 Lindbeck, 1984: 64.   
an exclusively intrasystemmatic, or ‘immanent’, and therefore only partial way.31 It 
would also be to turn a blind eye to the contribution of some contemporary linguistic 
philosophy (e.g. that of Jürgens Habermas). Habermasian theory presents formulaic 
truth in terms of  ‘enacted consensus’.  This does not deny the rule-governance of 
rational conversation that, Habermas argues, is established by intersubjectivity, but it 
does refuse to invest words with an absolute authority.32 The simplest conclusion to 
be drawn from all this is in line with the observation that ‘we cannot do without words 
but we must constantly remember their provisional, revisable character’.33  
  
One way of overcoming the problem of the gendered nature of divine analogues in the 
present work might have been to use a plurality of means of delineating them. 
However my contention that different approaches are appropriate for different uses 
leads me instead to use traditional terminology when referring to the historical 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity, and to suggest alternative, non-gendered 
terms which convey similar relationality when divine relationality becomes the 
subject in focus. I will also from hereon increasingly use Cunningham’s phrase ‘The 
Three’34 for the Trinity.  This is because I think it helps the process of applying the 
doctrine of the Trinity to avoid over-use of a term that as yet still bears the stamp of 
the patriarchal politics that are now associated with the BOM-FOG analogues. 
 
 
DIVINE RELATIONS 
 
 
Divine Ontology 
 
Early history of the doctrine.   
 
The doctrine of the Trinity is shorthand for most Christian belief about God. The 
liturgical version describes One God in Three Persons – Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
It originated in the christological struggles of the first four centuries of Christianity, 
which will be summarised here because they form the backdrop to an understanding 
of the doctrine. 
 
The doctrine was not arrived at easily, not least because it was not explicit in 
Scripture, and what it ‘means’ has been the source of debate for centuries35. Several of 
the earliest passages of New Covenant scripture (Matt 11:27; 24:36; 28:19; 1 Cor 
12:4-6; 2 Cor 13:13; 2 Thess 2:13-14) suggest a special connection between God the 
Father and Jesus the Son, though in a way that falls short of claiming Jesus is equal 
with God. The concept of Father-Son equality seems to have been developed in later 
texts (e.g. John 10:30). 
                                                          
31  
32 See Graham, 1996:147, and McCarthy, 1978. 
33 Holloway, 1997:xii. 
34 Cunningham, 1998. 
35 White, 1990:55.  
 
This suggests a development in the Christian understanding of God over time, which 
continued after the canon was closed and is an early example of the kind of evolution 
in Christianity that has been an important spur to the work of theology ever since. The 
problem for the theologians of the day was how to integrate the fresh data of the 
specifically Christian revelation with the Jewish doctrine of God. At the birth of the 
Church the dividing line between the Church and paganism was the monotheism it 
had inherited, in which God was regarded as ‘Father and creator’. How could this be 
integrated with the growing belief that Godself had been made known in the Person of 
Jesus of Nazareth, and God’s own Spirit had been poured out on the Church? 
  
*While the Church was struggling to understand what the ‘Jesus event’ meant for the 
Jewish God the outlines of a dyadic/triadic pattern for God were becoming more 
marked in the liturgy and day-to-day catechetical practice of the emerging Church. 
Yet Kelly says that the Apologists were all ardent monotheists, determined not to 
compromise the fundamental truth that God was One. For them truth ‘…was the 
Church’s bulwark against pagan polytheism, Gnostic emanationism and Marcionite 
dualism’. Believing God to be essentially rational they looked to contemporary 
philosophy for help, and by the time they were writing ‘the infiltration of secular 
thought’ in their intellectual understanding of God is obvious.36   
 
The impetus for the doctrine was originally a desire for an intellectually satisfying 
explanation of the relation of Christ to the Father. Irenaeus’ 2nd century solution was 
to employ Philo’s imagery of divine Logos for Christ - the use of λογος (logos) being 
‘undoubtedly a play on’ the word for rationality, λογικος (p10537). Employing this 
Stoic concept enabled the Apologists to think of ‘God the Father’ as the one Godhead 
when considered as author of whatever exists, with the generation of the Logos dating 
from the ‘Father’s’ emission for the purposes of creation, revelation and redemption.  
The eternal quality of the relationship of generation did not become the subject of 
orthodox interpretation until later.  
 
The groundwork for orthodoxy with regard to the Christian doctrine of God was being 
done at this time. Kelly speaks of Athenagoras inveighing against labelling as atheists 
‘men who acknowledge God the Father, God the Son and the Holy Spirit and declare 
both Their power in union and Their distinction in order’ (p103). We may note that 
this ‘order’ was not intended to suggest degrees of subordination within the Godhead. 
Also the phrase, ‘power in union’ (see later discussion of Mary Grey’s terminology). 
The relational and ‘difference’ implications of the doctrine were there from the start. 
Theophilus saw God as ‘forever conversing with His Word’ (p104), and Irenaeus 
brings out ‘the fact that there are real distinctions in the immanent being of the 
unique, indivisible Father’ (p108). 
 
Hippolytus (martyred 23538) and Tertullian (ca. 160-220) approached the problem 
from opposite directions. Hippolytus declared that there is always a plurality in the 
                                                          
36 
37 Kelly, 1977:105. From hereon in this chapter, all page references are to Kelly, 1977 (Chapter 4) 
unless otherwise stated. 
38 Farmer, 1997: 238. 
Godhead, while Tertullian taught that Jesus’ words in John 10:30 (‘I and the Father 
are One’) meant ‘one in reality… not one person’.  Nonetheless, they eventually 
arrived at similar concepts. Hippolytus spoke of Christ as ‘another’, but in doing so 
acknowledged that he was not speaking of two Gods, ‘but as it were, light from light, 
water from its source, a ray from the sun’.  That does not now sound so very different 
from Tertullian’s claim that the distinction between The Three was a ‘distinctio’ or 
‘dispositio’ (i.e. a distribution) not a ‘separatio’ – or separation (p112). This critique 
of the concept of separation will be seen to return later in this study in the theology of 
Mary Grey. 
 
*Third-century Trinitarian thought saw the emergence of conflicting tendencies 
(which provided the material for later controversies). It’s [no apostrophe of 
possession with “Its”] development in the west consistently preferred to ‘lean’ on the 
side of a profound conviction of the Unity of God. This was an emphasis of which 
‘modalism in all its forms was a well-intentioned distortion’ and in which 
subordinationism entered the catalogue of heresies (pp122,125,126).39  
 
Meanwhile, in the east a more ‘plural’ approach was establishing itself (as well as 
being impregnated with Neo-Platonic ideas about the hierarchy of being). I suspect 
the contemporary growth of theological interest in the Trinity in the West has its roots 
in a need to recover something that was ‘lost’ in the early East-West ‘split’ in 
Christianity. 
 
With reference to my present focus, evidence that the relationality of The Three was 
accepted early on is indicated by allegorical use of human relationships to describe the 
relationship between the Father and the Son. Origen held the view that Father and Son 
are ‘two things in respect of Their Persons, but one in unanimity, harmony and 
identity of will’.  He also appealed to scripture’s declaration that ‘man and wife, 
though distinct beings, can be one flesh, the righteous man and Christ can be one 
spirit, and Father and Son, though distinct, one God’ (p129). The subsequent 
movement of thought up to the Council of Nicea (325) shows the conception of a 
plurality of divine persons existing in relationship with each other being imprinted on 
the apostolic tradition and popular faith. That Council, and the later Council of 
Constantinople (381) proved a watershed in the development of the doctrine, and its 
description in orthodox Christian Creeds. 
 
The Creeds. 
 
The doctrine then went through the process of being encoded in a number of 
‘affirmations of faith’40, the most important being the Apostles’ Creed, the Nicene 
Creed and the Athanasian Creed. These are reproduced in the Appendix at the end. 
The Apostles’ Creed is the one in most common liturgical use.41 The very simplest 
version of it in present-day liturgical use may be the following, authorised for use as 
an alternative creed in a Baptism service in The Methodist Worship Book (1999):  
                                                          
39  
40  
41 E.g. Book of Common Prayer, p267/268; The Methodist Worship Book, 1999:66/67; Common 
Worship Initiation Services, 1998:24/5. 
 
“We believe in God the Father, who made the world. 
We believe in Jesus Christ, his Son, Who redeemed humankind. 
We believe in the Holy Spirit, who gives life to the people of God.”42 
 
*The Apostles’ Creed, which according to a legend in Rufinus’ day (ca.345-410) had 
been composed by the 12 apostles, was promoted by Charlemagne in the western 
church (ca. 742-814). It has a simple tripartite scheme constructed around the Father, 
the Son and the Holy Spirit.43 The Nicene Creed was hammered out at the first 
ecumenical council of Nicea in 325, convoked by Constantine to deal with the effects 
of Arius’ assertion that Jesus had not been co-eternal, but merely ‘the first among 
God’s creatures’.44   
 
Most often the creed referred to as the Nicene Creed45 is more precisely called the 
Nicene-Constantinople Creed because it was associated with the Council of 
Constantinople (381). It is the most commonly accepted creed among Christians and 
presupposes the original Nicene Creed but is more specific about the divinity of the 
Holy Spirit.46 It was ‘intended to guard believers against the most prominent doctrinal 
errors that were current at the time when it was drawn up’.47 
 
The most important thing about the Nicene Creed for the present enquiry is that it 
taught that Christ was in a ‘personal’ relationship to the Father – the “only-begotten” 
Son of the Father, and homoousios (Gr. “of the same being” or “consubstantial”) with 
the Father. In other words, the two Persons were consubstantial but not co-terminus, 
and the difference between the their termini was the relationship of parent and child.  
 
In this context it seems relevant to interject that before Nicea the Greek word for 
consubstantial (homoousious) meant ‘of generically the same substance’ rather than 
‘of identical substance’, which was a later idea. Fortman writes (in 1972) that ‘in 
recent years there has grown a tendency to question and reject this [latter] 
assumption’.48 I follow in this train of thought in that I seek later in this study to 
recover the idea of generation as fundamental to the meaning of the so-called divine 
‘names’ of Father and Son. For this project this sort of relational consideration proves 
more useful than the Nicean focus on divine substance or essence.  
 
                                                          
42 The Methodist Worship Book, 1999:92. 
43 Book of Common Prayer, pp11/12 & 22/23; ASB, pp57/58,80 & 68.   
44 O’Collins and Farrugia, 1991:18,50. 
45 Book of Common Prayer, p240; ASB, p123/124 & 181/182.   
46 O’Collins and Farrugia, 1991:157. 
47 Daniel, 1889:458. 
48 Fortman, 1972:67. 
The Athanasian Creed49 was falsely attributed to St Athanasius of Alexandra (ca. 296-
373) and probably originated in southern France in the 5th century.50  It’s importance 
for later argument in this project lies in the fact that it ‘gives prominence to the Trinity 
in Unity and Unity in Trinity’; the ‘differentia’ of the Three Persons and the co-
equality of the Three Persons. Also in that it teaches us ‘to distinguish the Three but 
not divide them’ and ‘to recognise the eternal generation of the Son and the eternal 
procession of the Holy Spirit, and yet to hold their co-eternity and co-equality with the 
Father’.51  
 
The subtle developments in Trinitarian theology seen in these creeds further invite us 
to continue the process of re-imaging Trinity to reflect what Christians believe. 
 
Perichoresis and Hypostatic Personhood. 
 
Perichoresis is a technical term, or kind of shorthand probably derived from 
περιχωρεω (perichoreo), meaning to go or come around from a combination of the 
Greek words χωρεω (choreo) and περι (peri). It refers to the permanently 
interpenetrative ‘going around’ in which The Three co-exist. Aland defines the verb 
χωρεω, when used in its transitive form in the New Testament, as also conveying the 
idea of ‘making room for’ or ‘having room for’ (in 2 Cor 7.2); accepting or practising 
(the celibate life); holding and containing (in Jn 2.6:21;25). He defines the preposition 
περι as ‘about’, ‘concerning’, ‘of’, ‘with reference to’ or alternatively ‘for’ or ‘on 
account of’ in its general form.52  These ideas give the flavour of The Threes’ 
perpetual movement and participation in the One God and in each other. They 
contribute to a working definition of Trinitarian perichoresis as ‘the reciprocal 
presence and interpenetration or coinherence of the three persons of the Trinity’.53  
 
Perichoresis is therefore to be understood as the process that enables the One-ness and 
the Three-ness of God to be presented as equivalent in the early creeds, and introduces 
us to the ultimate mystery of a God Who is not reducible to rational - or even 
irrational - theological description. Because of perichoresis the eternal similarity of 
The Three is thought to be so complete that any ‘essential’ epithet applied to one of 
them could be appropriated to each of the others. This means, for example, that while 
Jesus is described as ‘the truth’ in John 14:6, Julian of Norwich may also speak of 
‘the truth which is the Father seeing God who is the Son, the wisdom which is the 
Son beholding God who is the Father’.54 Because of perichoresis the eternal 
differences of the Three are thought to be so complete that they are known in terms of 
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permanent, non-transferable relations. In other words, the ‘Personhood’ of each of 
The Three is derived ‘from the relationships they sustain one with another’.55 
 
However, as has already been noted, in the description of The Three hammered out at 
Nicea, the One-ness and Three-ness of God were ‘explained’ in terms of the concept 
of substance, and which later led Aquinas to define the relationships of The Three as 
‘subsistent relationships’.56  Two words were used to denote substance.  The One-ness 
of God was spoken of in terms of ουσια (ousia) or ‘essence’, and the Three-ness of 
God in terms of hypostasis, or ‘specific individuality’.57 
 
A hypostasis was the substantial nature or reality of something and the word was 
commonly equated with ‘thing’.58  The letter to the Hebrews speaks of a 
‘Son…[Who]…reflects the very stamp’ of God’s reality, using the word 
υποστασεως (hypostaseos). 59  The term combines υπο, meaning ‘under’, with 
στασεως, referring (among other things) to a ‘standing’ or ‘existence’.60  The 
impression conveyed is one of ‘underlying substance, in the sense of being opposite to 
attributes or to what is unsubstantial’.61  
 
As a term, hypostasis denoted what unites The Three, in contrast to the term 
prosopon, which had the subtly different meaning of describing what in God is 
Three.62 Prosopon was the term employed by Hippolytus to signify the otherness or 
separate subsistences of the Son and the Father, but it had some disadvantages. It was 
the word of choice being used by the modalists, and it ‘created problems in 
christological and Trinitarian controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries, when it 
came to mean ‘concrete, individual reality’ or ‘distinct personal existence’.63  
 
When Tertullian translated the early doctrine into Latin he used the word ‘persona’, 
which was a word with the connotation of the mask of an actor (rather than the 
modern idea of self-consciousness which we associate with the notion of ‘person’).64 
Thus the Latins came to say that in God there was one substantia and three personae 
– one substance and three Persons. Whereas hypostasis had affirmed the objectivity of 
The Three, their ‘personae’ now tended to affirm their subjectivity. 
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I find it intriguing that the idea of the ‘personal’ is not absent from either concept. In 
the case of the word ‘hypostasis’ this becomes clearer in Boff’s description of a 
hypostasis as ‘the essential personality of a substance’.65  In any case, the introduction 
of the concept of personality immediately implies something relational about the three 
hypostaseis in the One God, because it implies the presence of an ‘other’ or ‘others’ in 
a relationship as the means of its discovery or revelation. 
 
I submit that the theological concepts of perichoresis and hypostatic personhood 
provide us with an image of God as a dynamic interacting (or ‘communing’) of 
essentially similar personalities that differ in some attribute that allows them to be 
regarded as ‘personal’. The perichoretic relationship between The Three does not lose 
sight of the One’s Threeness because the distinctness of the Personhood of each one 
of The Three is not found in separation from the others but rather in its unique set of 
relationships with the others. 
 
As has already been noted the uniqueness of each of the Three is marked by the use of 
the analogues by which they are most well known, namely, Father, Son and Spirit. 
These words are not ‘names’ in the strict sense, but descriptions of relationship. Their 
use reveals The Three as three mutual relationships in one God. However, 
relationships are not generally understood to be ‘substantial’ or ‘essential’ though 
these terms might be applied to the general relationality of those participating in 
relationships. As John Heywood Thomas puts it, we can distinguish the relations in 
the Trinity from the property of having relations, which belongs to all three 
relations.66  Within this shared relationality the Person in God known as the Father is 
defined in terms of the activity of generation, the Son in terms of being generated, and 
the Spirit in terms of a procession out of God that arises from the being together of the 
other two.67   
 
Bearing in mind my earlier critique of language I suggest the foregoing definitions 
make it possible to speak of The Three as Generator, Generated One and Spirit - 
Three Persons in One Godde. This terminology makes the fact of divine gender-
inclusivity explicit, and hence might serve contemporary Western society better than 
the traditional formulations of the Creed without losing the essence of the creedal 
formulations. These terms do, of course, require us to adopt a Christology in which 
the essential feature of the Son is taken to be his humanity rather than his 
masculinity68.  Such an understanding is already implicit in the choice of the words 
used in the original formulations. In them, the word used for Christ was ανθρωπος 
(anthropos), meaning ‘man’ or ‘human’ not ανηρ (aner), meaning ‘a man’ or ‘an 
husband’69 and the (Latin) claim that God became homo, not vir (i.e. human, not a 
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man).  In my opinion the suggested terms adequately represent the creedal 
formulations because they address the relational personalities of the Three without 
losing the sense that they are both existing and locatable and existing but not 
locatable. 
 
 
The Trinity as The Core of Our Desire. 
 
 
Introduction to Mary Grey.   
 
*The following is a brief introduction to Mary Grey, her methodology, style, and to 
the themes that run through her published works, including her theology of God. 
 
Mary Grey is an English Roman Catholic who has studied and worked in the 
Netherlands and Belgium and as Professor of Theology at Southampton University.  
Her first degree was in Literae Humaniores at Oxford and her use of ancient myths to 
illustrate her ideas has become almost a hallmark of her work. She is what I would 
call an existentialist70 feminist theologian working with orthodox Christian themes.  
 
The way I have set about the present enquiry has been influenced by Grey’s 
methodology, which is ‘dialogical’, and which has influenced the theological method 
I have opted to use in the present enquiry. Grey argues for a ‘dialogical’ methodology 
in an article which she tells me she ‘personally sets some significance by’71 and which 
is entitled, ‘Is dialogue a necessary presupposition for the discovery of truth?’.72  
 
*Grey’s style is flowing, imaginative and eclectic. It is very dependent on words, yet 
her use of words has the tenor of a struggle, as she links them together in unwieldy 
combinations such as ‘cosmic-justice-making’, and ‘mutuality-in-relation’ and 
sometimes seems to ‘throw’ them at the page.73 It is as if Grey continually finds 
words inadequate as a means of communication.74  
 
Grey deals in ‘Christian Feminist Theology’ and claims it is ‘inspired by memory and 
vision’ (italics hers).75  It is therefore perhaps not surprising that in her feminist 
theology she is frequently found employing words like re-claiming and re-sourcing, 
re-examining, redeeming, re-weaving and relating. This is because she understands 
the task of theology to be that of re-claiming and re-sourcing ‘the living waters of 
tradition’76 which is often ‘re-examined’77 in her work (e.g. her re-examination of the 
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tradition of Mary78). She is found talking about ‘Redeeming the Dream’ of 
Redemption and Atonement from a basis of her belief that the whole enterprise of 
feminist theology is about Redemption and reclaiming what is lost.79 She is concerned 
to recover the contribution women have made to mission theology.80 She is found 
claiming that ‘Feminist method is at home with the metaphors of unravelling and re-
weaving’81, and urging us to ‘re-weave the patterns of our relating’.82 In one of her 
articles she claims to build on American feminist theologian Carter Heyward’s 
‘relational theology’83 and in the article which came under particular scrutiny for this 
project she developed the theme of God as ‘power-in-relation’.84 
 
The most important aspect of her work for this thesis is her focus on relationality.   
She is concerned that Christians re-connect with what she calls ‘mutuality-in-relation’ 
using ‘connected knowing’ as an antidote to what she describes as the oppressive 
forms of logic that Christians have inherited from their tradition.85  In her book, The 
Wisdom of Fools Grey presents our present culture as balanced between two ways of 
interpreting the world.  The first she describes as ‘logocentric’, profit-based, dualistic 
and competitive.  The second she describes as non-dualistic, non-competitive, 
ecological and relational. She characterises the first approach as Logos and the second 
as Sophia, and they engage in dialogue with each other.  The hero of the book is 
called Perceval, who is styled as a Court Fool who is seeking to discover the question 
that will unlock the meaning of life.  He is aware that, in the words of Romans 8:22, 
‘nature is groaning for redemption’, and the planet is dying.  In the end he discovers 
that his own Christian faith is part of the problem and becomes depressed.  Hope 
revives when, sitting by the Chalice Well at Glastonbury, like Jesus did by a well in 
Samaria, a woman performs a simple act of kindness and gives him a drink of water.86 
This kind of ultimate appeal to the wordless action rather than the problematic word is 
one of the features that makes Grey’s theology so attractive to a search for a 
pragmatic model of human care. 
 
Grey’s model of Trinity. 
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Grey’s model of Trinity is described in her article, ‘The Core of Our Desire’, 
published in 1991. One of the reasons why I became interested in using it for this 
research was because it is a contemporary model, and another because it treats the 
Trinity as a feminist symbol. With regard to the latter, Grey argues that feminist 
spirituality is intrinsic to the symbol of the Trinity.87  This felt important if I was to 
use the doctrine as a ‘pattern’ for a pastoral care, in line with my desire to arrive at an 
‘adequately feminist’ as well as contemporary paradigm.  
 
Grey makes particular appeal to the previously mentioned emphasis on relationality in 
all her work – the idea of development, growth and the ‘relational self’. Her point is 
that we are all, including God, multi-dimensional and ‘relational’. That it is 
separation that needs explanation rather than empathy and connection.88 The 
‘feminist’ connotation of this observation seems to derive less from its liberationist 
perspective than from the fact that in contemporary theology the attribute of the 
relationality of God is rarely appealed to outside the discipline of feminist theology.89  
 
Grey continues to use the traditional male analogues for the Three, though it is clear 
she is not unaware of the ways in which terminology may pose a problem. She reverts 
to Ruether’s term90 ‘God/ess’ for God towards the end of the article, pointing out that 
God/ess is clearly revealed as the ‘core of our desire’ for women.91 Furthermore S/he 
(i.e.God/ess) is also the object of women’s encounter, for S/he can be encountered in 
‘our deep sense of connected knowing, the deep wisdom of God, the depths of our 
relational being’.92  
 
Grey appears to take a non-hierarchical interpretation of The Three for granted. She 
points to the notion of ‘connected subjectivity’ in what could be called a 
psychoanalytic model of personhood, in an effort to provide a ‘new’ philosophical 
starting-point for discussion of both the human and the divine. She talks of a ‘feminist 
process concept of relationality offer[ing] the concept of “the relational self”, or 
“many selves” held together in fluid unity’.93  She feels that herein lies a way of 
releasing or liberating transcendent human subjectivity from its interpretation as 
‘other than self’. From being seen as something separated from that with which 
‘immanence’ is usually identified. In doing this she is seeking to counteract the 
history of damaging psychological relations within the Trinity94 that has promoted 
models of subordination in human relationships.95 
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In her efforts to describe a ‘new theological starting-point’ Grey is found proposing 
that Judeo-Christian faith sources should be viewed as undervaluing immanence. 
Primeval chaos ought to be re-imaged, not as a formless immanence resisting 
creativity, form and rationality but as a relational integrity with a ‘rich, many-layered 
interiority’ for which the process of divine creation is one of invitation – or ‘ “lure” 
towards new patterns of connection’.96  She further claims that if one images the 
Godhead as Father, the Father-Son relationship becomes the dominant unit within the 
Trinity. When the Father/Son unity is stressed it becomes ‘the vertical oneness of 
separative transcendental subjectivity’. This, she says, is a relatively recent 
ideological construct that becomes striking in ‘post-Tridentine, Barthian theology’, 
which sits in sharp contrast with the ‘connective, organic’ New Testament images of  
Christ the Vine, the communal Body of Christ, and Christ identified with the poor and 
suffering.97  
 
Most Christology that sits within this ideological approach locks Jesus into this 
‘vertical’ form of transcendence, and ‘imprisons’ incarnational language in a struggle 
to maintain the emphasis on separation that is the hallmark of ‘separative 
transcendental subjectivity’. This obtains even to the extent of making spatial imagery 
appear to be intrinsically linked with incarnation (e.g. ‘He came down from 
Heaven…’ in the Nicene Creed).98  As a result of this there is a felt need to require 
separation between God and humanity, which Grey holds prevents us from ‘re-
imaging transcendence through a multi-dimensional richness of human bonding’, and 
from re-conceiving the relationship of transcendence to immanence. Grey suggests we 
do the latter by regarding Jesus’ bonding with all those significant people around him 
as… ‘the very source of the unique profundity of his relationship with God’.99  
 
Commentary 
 
Theological critique. 
 
*One of the first questions to ask of Grey’s model is ‘Is it adequately Trinitarian?’, 
by which I mean, ‘Does it avoid heresy?’. As pointed to in the section above 
describing the early history of the doctrine, there are at least two well-rehearsed 
theological dangers this applies to – description which starts (only) from the basis of 
God’s ‘monarchical’ unity, and runs the risk of modalism; and description which 
starts (only) from a view of God as essentially Three, which can be Tri-theistic and 
runs the risk of  subordinationism. To these potential problems I would add a third…. 
description that fails to understand the names  Father, Son and Spirit applied to the 
Trinity as analogues depicting relationship rather than substance, and thereby runs the 
risk of sexism.100  Grey shows herself keen to avoid all three. Rather than weight the 
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Three over against the One, or vice versa, or present God in terms that pose the sexes 
as sufficiently ‘opposite’ for gendered ‘meaning’ to be introduced, Grey seeks to 
negate distortions by refusing the most fundamental of ideological dualisms, that of 
transcendence versus immanence.  
 
This leads me to ask, Can Grey’s critique of the immanence-transcendence dualism 
be upheld theologically?  I think it can, but only provided it is understood that Grey is 
not proposing we collapse them into each other. Provided she is disputing the dualism 
without portraying either immanence or transcendence as needing to give way to the 
other, or suggesting we negate them both.  This is, in effect, what Grey is saying, 
because she does not understand connection as necessitating a merger.  She is merely 
seeking a holistic approach which allows both concepts to be seen in ‘both…and’ 
terms rather than ‘either…or’ terms. I think the ‘both…and’ approach is particularly 
valuable for the purpose of applying theology, whereas the ‘either…or’ approach has 
its uses in theoretical theological discourse.  In other words, I would argue for the 
validity of both attitudes, according to context. 
 
Dualisms might be thought of as ‘too-simplistic’ representations of reality, having a 
‘word power’ in the postmodern sense capable of producing distortions in the way we 
think. What is innovative about Grey’s approach is that it applies a liberationist 
hermeneutic to what we now know about the influence of Greek philosophy on early 
Christianity. This leads me to view Grey’s thesis as orthodox. As an effort to refuse 
distortions created by, or accretions that have been clinging to, the language used to 
communicate the doctrine of the Trinity without losing the doctrine’s power to 
communicate the Christian faith.   
 
‘External’ support for this position may be seen in the increasingly accepted 
Rahnerian claim that the ‘immanent’ trinity and the ‘economic’ trinity are one and the 
same101, and in conventional Christology and Pneumatology. In the latter the Spirit is 
seen as ‘proceeding from’ or ‘spilling out’ of Godde into Creation.102 For the Spirit to 
be capable of leaving Godde completely we would need to deny the possibility for it 
to participate fully in the perichoretic relationship. A truly perichoretic action would 
require the Spirit to fully bear all of the Three in that relation of ‘proceeding from’, or 
‘spilling out’ beyond the boundaries of what is only Godde into what is created - 
blurring any distinction we might wish to make between Creator and created. In the 
former, the Generated One is regarded as both fully human and fully divine, without 
separation. This has the effect of drawing flesh and blood – that which we think of as 
created - ‘back’ into the Creator in a sense that breaks down the barrier between the 
two. All in all, the process of re-imaging Trinity in terms of a combined subjective 
and objective may be thought of as no less Trinitarian a theological ‘project’ than 
describing the Generated One as a totally combined divine and human being.  
 
Yet another question might be, Is the pronounced egality between divine Persons in 
Grey’s model acceptable? Grey appears to adopt what I regard as a common 
misconception in popular feminist theology - that a hierarchical interpretation of the 
Trinity is necessarily patriarchal. To quote from a recent discussion on an Internet 
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mailbase – it is often thought that there are ‘two models [of how we] control how we 
view the world, the patriarchal and the egalitarian’103, which implies hierarchy is 
necessarily patriarchal. I think a lot depends on what is being intended in the use of 
both words. For the present purpose I propose to define hierarchy as referring to a 
structured difference in the exercise of authority, rather than to ‘exercising power over 
others’, which is the problem with patriarchy. If we understand hierarchy in terms of 
systems of practical deference without investing these relations with connotations of 
disempowerment or coercive obligation then we will no longer assume autonomies 
that are alien to an ‘co-equivalent’ model of Trinity. With this understood, if I am 
prepared to view the ‘either…or’ approach to immanence and transcendence as 
having merit in some circumstances then I must also be prepared to appreciate the 
value of hierarchy in some circumstances.  
 
I feel the question stems from re-visiting one of the ideas that the Athanasian Creed 
addressed, which was that filiation and procession bestow subordination, which is not 
a logical conclusion. The Athanasian Creed holds that ‘none is afore, or after another: 
none is greater, or less than another. But the whole three Persons are co-eternal 
together: and co-equal’.104  I also feel Hippolytus’ choice of the indistinguishable 
‘Light from Light’ as a means of describing the relationship between the Father and 
the Son begins to solve the question of how hierarchy and equality can live together.  
  
Hierarchy, Egality and Patriarchy. 
 
A further consideration of the question of the politics of God leads me to point to the 
popular view that the First Person of the Three is to be regarded as uniquely 
equivalent to the God-head, which Grey’s article takes to task.105 This view is, 
however, the obvious interpretation of the phrase in the Nicene creed which speaks of 
‘….the Father, By whom all things are made’. Apparently ‘the stress on equality [of 
the Persons]… was never understood as detracting from a certain primacy of the 
Father’ in history.106 If this statement has the appearance of an oxymoron, I suggest 
the reason is the contemporary predilection for ‘images’ – for ‘fixing’ truth, including 
the truth of God, rather than allowing change. For preferring to deal in words about 
God rather than relationship with a relational God. To put this in yet more words - for 
dealing in ‘facts’ rather than processes.  
 
So in what way could The Three be both equal and hierarchical? I suggest that the 
difference lies in the purpose for which they are anything. For example, it does seem 
unlikely that, given the emphases of the Athanasian Creed, the earlier formulations of 
the doctrine intended it to exclude the Son and Spirit from the activity of creation. A 
consubstantial nature implies an equally shared ‘principle’ of creativity. Hierarchy is 
found to take the shape of patriarchy when the view that the Father is the unique 
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Source of all is held in an essentialist manner. Described by Boff as ‘trinitarian 
monotheism’ this view has produced a ‘pyramidal model of the church’107 in the 
context of the partiality of the philosophical ideologies that have been informing the 
Church as to the nature of the ‘real’ since the inception of Christianity. That does not 
mean these ideologies are immutable.  It needs to be increasingly realised that the use 
of the apparently patriarchal analogue of ‘Father’ rather than ‘Mother’ for the First 
Person of The Three is consonant with scientific understanding right up until the turn 
of the present century. Until then it was thought that men supplied the generative 
‘seed’ and women supplied only the womb-container in the process of procreation. 
 
It follows from the above that ‘an egalitarian understanding of Trinity such as Grey’s 
is not necessarily more quintessentially ‘feminist’ than a hierarchical understanding 
might be, nor vice versa’.108   Nevertheless, it needs to be admitted that the experience 
of hierarchy is too often one of patriarchal domination, and that the idea of 
domination is generally associated with the word. I have already suggested one 
possible way forward with regard to redeeming the concept of hierarchy. This is to re-
image the Father in terms of ‘Generator’. This, at least, would make it easier to refute 
the suggestion that the appearance of divine inter-Personal hierarchy in God is 
inconsistent with a feminist liberationist politics. There are also obvious corollaries 
with regard to social organisation. 
 
In the end I regard the tensions we may experience between the concepts of egality 
and hierarchy in God as being useful. They have their roots in the way orthodox 
Christology permanently impinges upon and ‘destabilises’ Trinitarian theology, by 
introducing the ‘fully human’ into the divine. However, I propose that they are only 
actually experienced in tension where the struggle is not for clarity of thought so 
much as for some way of maintaining (perhaps we should say ‘hanging onto’?) the 
‘separative divine transcendence’ that Grey disputes.   
 
It seems possible to me that it is the maintenance of a focus on separation rather than 
the use of masculine analogues for God that is the factor that ultimately undergirds 
patriarchal politics in Christian cultures. Also that this is a precursor of the 
individualism of contemporary Western culture.109  Commenting on the content of 
chapter Three in a 1990 ACCM appraisal of colleges and courses Greenwood notes 
that in some cases the ‘trinitarian stances’ employed in the courses ‘reinforce 
hierarchy and individualism’ in the students.110 It seems clear in this context that 
hierarchy is being thought of in terms of domination and subservience. A ‘trinitarian 
stance’ after the pattern of Grey’s model would locate the authority in any system in 
the combined will of equal subjects who find themselves caught up in the system in 
some way. My critique of this would stay with the idea that egality is seen as 
foundational to authority, but add the rider that this authority may be implemented 
hierarchically. 
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Epistemological critique 
 
Earlier in this study I mentioned briefly how ‘Trinitarian’ the feminist standpoint 
position of Elizabeth Grosz sounded to my ears when I first encountered it.  If, 
conversely, I now seek to use Grosz’s epistemology as a yardstick with which to 
assess Divine ontology as here described I find I see the likeness in reverse.   
 
This can be shown diagrammatically. The process of perichoresis can be understood 
as preventing the One-ness and the Three-ness of God from being mutually exclusive, 
which means one could never validly represent The Three as entirely separate.  There 
would always need to be some sort of overlap, as suggested in Fig. 4.  It would, in 
fact, enable a co-terminus representation of the Three with regard to the consideration 
of shared substance (such as shared ‘relationality’) as in Fig. 5. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Fig. 4               Fig. 5 
 
 
So far, neither of these representations mirror my chosen epistemology concerning 
‘material truths [that] differ, overlap, and are not co-terminus’111 (reference Fig.1). 
However, when we shift the focus away from the substantial language that dominates 
the Creeds, and instead focus on the interrelationships that indicate the hypostatic 
personhood of the Three we find they can be represented two-dimensionally, as in 
Fig. 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Fig. 6 
 
Fig 6. Diagrammatic representation of the interrelationships of the Three. 
 
Comparing this with Fig .1 allows me to claim that a relational model of the Three 
satisfies a postmodern epistemological critique. This shift to understand The Three in 
relational terms is important to my thesis in that it provides me with a Unity in terms 
of relationship that is not dependent upon co-terminosity in God as well as within the 
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boundaries of a pastoral care relationship.  This helps validate a unitary concept of 
pastoral care that does not specify the nature of the plurality of persons involved in it. 
 
One further epistemological comment concerns the way the ‘feminist process theism’ 
seen in Grey’s model is found to be in dispute with the ‘predominant individualist 
structure of western philosophy’.112  Having begun with the ‘basic insight of feminist 
studies … that women often describe their experience using the terms relatedness and 
interconnection’, Grey ends up arguing for a ‘metaphysic of connection’ as an 
‘alternative model to that of individualism’.113  
 
The epistemological base for individualism is presented in some of Grey’s work as 
‘logocentric thinking’. It is a way of thinking criticised in feminist theology that is 
currently building upon Grey’s work.114  It is a form of rationality that fails to 
appreciate the connectedness of reality, and consistently confines reality to that which 
is known and/or can be spoken of. It undergirds dualistic analysis and fails to allow 
ontologically different ‘material truths’ to ‘overlap’. In other words, its’ root problem 
is that it is not ‘truly’ postmodern, or ‘postmodern enough’. Both logocentric thinking 
and individualism are tempered by the idea of the ‘overlapping’ of truths in much the 
same way as by the idea of ‘connected knowing’ that is proposed in Grey’s 
metaphysic of connection. They are also both countered by the ‘listening logic’ Grey 
proposes as a means of arriving at other ways of knowing such as those ‘issuing from 
Christian Feminist base communities’.115  
 
It would be interesting to discover whether this epistemological slant on Grey’s 
metaphysic of connection could only resonate in a culture already impregnated with a 
Trinitarian theology of God. In other words, to investigate the degree to which a 
culture’s epistemology and theology of God are related. For the situated purpose of 
this study what is important is that it takes us beyond the simple species-resemblance 
of the perichoretic model in Fig. 6. It opens up the door for a ‘unitary’ model of 
pastoral care that will prefer connection of different planes of material reality over the 
uni-valency of description in terms of either non-essential or essential categories. As 
will be seen, this later gives me scope for what might be called a multi-dimensional 
paradigm of care. 
 
Methodological considerations. 
 
I have laboured the foregoing commentary on Grey’s model because it seemed 
necessary to argue the applicability of a divine template to questions of human 
relationship. Also because Grey’s challenge to a non-transferable transcendent-
immanent split in which Divine equals transcendent and Human equals immanent 
supports my intention to examine the Trinitarian picture of divine relations for the 
purposes of building a picture of human relations that echoes them.  
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Grey’s rebuttal of a ‘separative transcendental subjectivity’ also supports other 
aspects of this project. The idea of connection without merger is methodologically 
helpful with regard to the task of delineating theological boundaries. It also 
encourages the correlative method of doing theology and supports my proposal to 
correlate divine and human relating in a dialogical way. In the process it hints at what 
might be thought of as a kind of ‘dialogical authority’ in theological method. 
 
A note of caution… 
 
With regard to the process of arriving at a paradigm for pastoral care, a note of 
caution needs to be introduced at this point. The foregoing arguments require us to 
refuse to view what is divine and what is human through separate lenses, and to 
examine anthropology as well as theology for clues about divinity, and divinity as 
well as anthropology for clues about humanity. They lead us to approve Grey’s 
theological use of psychotherapeutic insights, and, I submit, would approve a 
psychotherapeutic use of theological insights. They suggest the relevance of Grey’s 
theology of God to any search for a more authentic understanding of what it is to be 
truly human, without which any paradigm for a human relationship must be suspect. 
However, it would be reasonable to doubt these findings on the grounds that the 
‘Persons’ whose divine relating I wish to examine are hypostaseis, and not humans.  
In other words that they are too dissimilar from human persons for the attributes of 
their relations to be relevant to human relations. This introduces an important note of 
caution and provisionality into my use of Trinitarian relations as a model for a human 
relationship unless human personhood that can only be offset by demonstrating that 
human personhood can be conceived of as at least partially analogous to Divine 
Personhood.  
 
This is where the influence of the traditional Christian doctrine of human Creation in 
God’s image116 on my work needs to be acknowledged. Nevertheless, even without 
this influence I feel the foregoing discussion is heuristic of an anthropological enquiry 
into the extent to which I may appeal to the intra-personal relations of Godde as 
paradigmic for pastoral inter-personal care. To answer the question: Is there any 
evidence that human personhood can also be regarded as ‘hypostatic’? 
 
 
HUMAN RELATIONS. 
 
 
Human Ontology 
 
Anthropology. 
 
Grey’s critique of the concept of a separative transcendental subjectivity enables us to 
re-image The Three as both a Self and selves in a way that does not require a 
separation between subjectivity and objectivity.  It is therefore relevant to note that 
this is what some contemporary anthropologies are saying about the nature of human 
being. The caution expressed above is less of a problem when one holds a socio-
                                                          
116 Genesis 1:27. 
psychoanalytic anthropology. I will briefly examine two contemporary theories of 
‘personhood’ in support of this claim - one socio-political and one psychotherapeutic. 
 
The first is described in Alistair McFadyen’s book, ‘The Call to Personhood’117, and 
is evidence of a drift in social anthropology towards an understanding of a ‘person’ in 
terms of their social location. The principal theme of the book is a description of 
personal identity as centering on one’s place in what he describes as the social matrix, 
which is a kind of sedimentation of one’s ongoing experience of social relations. To 
put this more simply, human personhood is being seen as a product of one’s 
relationality rather than one’s individuality.  This is a useful variation on what 
Comblin describes in his ‘Christian anthropology’ as a more general move to re-
affirm ‘personalism’, or the sense of ‘individual in community’, in pastoral 
theology.118 
 
If we accept that God is essentially relational McFadyen’s thesis unknowingly 
supports the doctrinal contention that human beings are created in God’s image.  This, 
in turn, supports the premise that the Divine Image can be mined for clues as to what 
will enable true humanity. It also supports the idea that true humanity will be 
promoted when a human relationship is ‘created in the image’ of intra-divine 
relationship. All of which leads me to propose that a Trinitarian pastoral relationship 
will foster a truly human ‘personhood’. 
 
The contribution of a psychotherapeutic understanding of personhood is equally 
intriguing.  Stock-Whittaker119 has shaped insights from the two main schools of 
thought in British group analysis/psychotherapy (i.e., Foulkes and Bion) 120 into a 
practical therapy that is growing in popularity, and which takes a psychotherapeutic 
anthropology as axiomatic. Her psychotherapeutic approach to personhood works 
from a model of a person as composed of ‘parts’ which can become split off, 
transferred, or ‘projected’ out of oneself onto another or others. She finds ways of 
using this understanding therapeutically in the search for a greater ‘wholeness’ on the 
basis of observation that in the case of groups where participants are removed from 
their social locations the dislocation of these ‘parts’ becomes more obvious. This 
understanding of personhood sounds suspiciously like the idea of Godhood being 
made up of a plurality of ‘parts’ that remain, become ‘transferred’, or process ‘out’ of 
the Self. 
 
*A particularly dramatic contribution to the discussion lies in the group analytic 
understanding of ‘projective identification’.  This process is said to be occurring when 
an emotional experience that one person has but doesn’t [write in full] want is 
projected out of themselves onto another or others. At which point, provided the 
other(s) accept the projection – which they are often not skilled enough to resist doing 
- they end up experiencing the emotion as if it was their own.  In other words, they 
                                                          
117 McFadyen, 1990. 
118 Comblin, 1990:117                                   
119 Stock-Whitaker, 1985. 
120  
‘identify’ with the projection, and it affects their own behaviour. When the feeling is 
examined under professionally controlled conditions it presents as irrational and often 
uncharacteristic and can be traced back to the one projecting it, who can then be 
invited to ‘reclaim’ it and deal with it if they need to.121 In general our knowledge of 
this process suggests that human persons may live a less separate existence than is 
generally imagined, and that there is a limited sense in which human beings also 
experience a kind of perichoresis.  
 
*Ecclesiology. 
 
The nature of human relationality undergirds the study of ecclesiology, so it is 
relevant to note that the concept of human hypostatic personhood is increasingly 
found informing contemporary ecclesiology, such as that of Zizioulas, who is 
particularly concerned with finding ways of being church that do not involve 
domination.122 Commenting on Zizioulas’ approach in the context of a discussion of 
the impact a relational theology has on ecclesiology Greenwood claims that, 
 
‘Indispensable to understanding the work of Zizioulas are an awareness of two 
‘patristic keys’: (a) There is no true being without communion.  Nothing exists as 
an individual conceivable in itself.  Communion is an ontological category; and (b) 
Communion which does not come from a ‘hypostasis’, a concrete and free person, 
and which does not lead to ‘hypostases’, concrete and free persons, is not an 
‘image’ of the being of God. ……a triune God whose inner life may be expressed 
in terms of perichoretic being, implies a Church in which there are no permanent 
structure of subordination but rather, overlapping patterns of mutual 
relationship.’123  
 
This not only accepts the appropriateness of ‘translating’ Trinitarian theology into the 
arena of human relations, but also suggests a new definition of a hypostasis – as a 
‘concrete and free person’.  If we are disposed to think this possible of humans then 
human and divine ‘persons’ cannot be so very different. 
 
I will now proceed by examining the nature of pastoral relationships. 
 
Pastoral counselling. 
 
*Within the plethora of what Clinebell calls the basic types of pastoral care and 
counselling the thing that stands out is the ‘crucial importance of pastoral counselling’ 
to pastoral care124. Although much practical theology is currently at pains to ‘shift 
paradigms’ and widen the original scope of the discipline from its former narrow 
focus on the one-to-one counsel offered by a pastor, the paradigm that is emerging 
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does not lose interest in this basic theme.125  The search for the means to include more 
than previously in the definition of pastoral care is merely being carried further, so 
that pastoral care and counselling will be more useful to all.126  If anything, the search 
is for ways of honing pastoral counselling into a more worthy tool, through looking 
for more comprehensive ways of applying a praxis-based hermeneutic – a 
groundedness in human experience - to the subject. In other words, for ways of taking 
inter-personal relationships and the need for quality and authenticity in pastoral 
counselling even more seriously. So it is appropriate to examine a contemporary 
model of pastoral counselling for what it offers my thesis concerning pastoral care in 
general. For the present purpose I will be treating pastoral counselling as a kind of 
‘ambassador’ or representative of pastoral care as a whole. 
 
*I feel Rod Burton’s recent description of pastoral counselling can be thought of in 
these terms. He presents a case for ‘reframing’ pastoral counselling in terms of 
‘therapeutic spiritual direction’.127  He defines pastoral counselling in current practice 
as utilising a collaborative relationship. This  is a relationship that is ‘established 
between counsellor and counsellee to help people take responsibility for their lives in 
the present moment [and] make realistic and creative choices in respect of their 
immediate situation, and thus aims at setting them free for life in its fullness.’ 128  He 
also claims that ‘convergence continues to occur between spiritual direction and 
psychotherapy’ with the possibility that ‘underlying anthropological assumptions may 
come to be all that distinguishes these two disciplines.’ Hence it is not surprising that 
he begins his new model on the basis of a psychotherapeutic understanding of the 
interpersonal relationship that Burton claims is generally given primacy in pastoral 
counselling.129 
 
A highly simplified version of the diagram Burton employs to depict the nature of this 
relationship is reproduced in Fig 7 below. This model indicates a (two-dimensional) 
‘overlap’ of the persons involved, and the fact that, to quote the figure’s 
accompanying text, ‘God’s presence in the relationship between counsellor and 
counsellee is neither affirmed nor denied’. Next Burton introduces us to a description 
of pastoral counselling subtitled ‘God’s presence is explicitly acknowledged, without 
necessarily impinging on the therapeutic relationship’.  His diagrammatic 
representation of this situation, again highly simplified, appears in Fig.8.  Finally, as a 
result of his argument for reframing pastoral counselling in terms of Spiritual 
Direction Burton is able to draw a new diagram, reproduced, again in a highly 
simplified format, in Fig. 9. 
 
*In Burton’s original version of this latter diagram the accompanying text says we see 
‘counsellor and counsellee consciously and deliberately enter[ing] into a trialogical 
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relationship with God’.130 We also see something else.  We see three participants in a 
relationship in which the three are portrayed as ‘different, overlapping, but not co-
terminus’ participants in the relationship.  This echoes not only the epistemology that 
undergirds this study, but also the model of Trinity being used in this dissertation.  It 
would seem reasonable to examine that model for clues as to the nature of Trinitarian 
pastoral care. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 7.  Psychotherapy.131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 8. Pastoral Counselling (see reference to Fig 7). 
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Fig 9. Spiritual Direction (see reference to Fig 7). 
 
 
 
 
*Pastoral Care. 
 
The nature of Pastoral Care has often been described in terms of functions – for 
example, Clebsch and Jaekle’s broad examination of the Christian heritage produced a 
long-respected definition of pastoral care as  Healing, Sustaining, Guiding and 
Reconciling132. It seems to me, however, that a more useful approach for the current 
age would be to turn to matters of policy. That it will ultimately prove more useful to 
contemporary society to know ‘what Godde is like’ than ‘what God has been doing’. 
 
Returning to my diagrammatic representation of the model of Trinity (reproduced in 
Fig 10 with a new legend) the task becomes that of asking what it reveals of the 
policy that informs the mode of relating in Godde. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.  A diagrammatic representation of The Three, with the different shapes 
representing the different Persons (as seen in the following legend). 
 
 
 
Generator 
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Encounter. 
 
Inevitably, what different people see in this representation will differ, which is where 
the situatedness of my analysis comes to the fore, and I immediately need to own  it as 
inherently provisional. Nonetheless I suspect that there would be wide agreement that 
the shapes in the figure above are touching each other.  That they are very close, as 
opposed to being scattered on the page. Whatever else may not be deduced from this 
it indicates contact that, if it ceased, would destroy the ability of the diagram to 
represent Godde. Putting this into more relationship-oriented language, what we are 
looking at is the Three meeting up with, or encountering each other.  
 
Studies into the consequences of maternal deprivation in infancy suggest just how 
important human encounter is. The general conclusion from research investigating 
why children in child care institutions do not tend to thrive as well as those with their 
natural parents was that ‘the deprivation offered by the institution chiefly stems from 
insufficiency of intimate interpersonal interaction’ rather than sensory or other 
deprivation.133  To be deprived of encounter in infancy results in developmental 
retardation – often a global impairment of developmental processes, with language 
and social responsiveness usually most affected.134  
 
Translating this into the language of pastoral care, this means that for care to be 
pastoral in the Trinitarian mode (hereafter simply ‘pastoral’) it, too, must involve 
encounter, whether at a one-to-one or one-to-group level.135 It becomes important to 
encounter people, rather than simply speak or listen to them. 
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This is because encounter as I am choosing to define it here is not a one-sided matter. 
It cannot be said that one shape in the diagram is qualitatively touching another 
‘more’ even though there may be quantitative differences. This mutual touching bears 
resemblance to an understanding of communication, defined as ‘transmission of 
information to elicit a response’, with especial interest in the transmission of non-
verbal information.136  This sort of communication is a mutual activity, for the activity 
of perception and reception is crucial part to the process. It is not personality-
dependent either, for it is only in the process of encounter, understood in terms of 
communication, that the responses we assign to personality are discovered.   
 
This is one reason why different personalities cannot be said to encounter more than 
others, even while some will be more cautious in revealing information about 
themselves or seeking information about others. Neither the Briggs Myers nor the 
Enneagram personality systems require us to think of encounter in non-mutual terms. 
137 They both present personality as a more or less genetically influenced human 
response to the effects of encountering in early socialisation, and recognise that 
personality only becomes apparent, even to the individual displaying it, in further 
encounters. 
 
As a guide for pastoral practice therefore, the principle of mutual encounter would 
make it impossible for a pastor to ‘give out’ pastoral care of a one-sided nature. This 
is not to say it would require participants to respond to each other in an equivalent 
manner, but rather that the element of ‘taking into account’ of the other in encounter 
be a mutual experience. By this description one could not claim to be providing 
pastoral care through publishing a book, even if its theme was the praxis of pastoral 
care. The principle of encounter would require the lives involved to be ‘touched’ in 
some way.138 
 
Empathy. 
 
A second feature of the diagram in Fig 10 is the overlap between the shapes.  The fact 
that the mode of presentation enables us to see their outlines ‘through’ the other 
shapes suggests their interpenetration (to use a perichoretic term). It hints at the kind 
of sharing of each others’ existence that in relationship terms might best be described 
in terms of empathy. It is also worth noting that while many overlaps are only 
between two participants there is also a significant overlap of all three.  
 
Looking back at Burton’s model of Therapeutic Spiritual Direction (Fig 9.) we see an 
expression of the sense many Christians have that God lives beyond us, outside our 
world. Transcending it as well as encompassing and pervading it. Both Counsellor 
and Counsellee are seen to have a ‘private’ overlap with God that is not shared with 
the other human and exists other than at the point of encounter between them. 
However, at the point of encounter, that overlap is shared, intensifying the 
significance of the otherwise apparently limited overlap between the two humans. 
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It needs to be noted that while the shapes indicate the differences between The Three 
they cannot also convey the action of perichoresis in which the overlap of the Three is 
more correctly entire. This suggests that care that begins in the mode of Therapeutic 
Spiritual Direction, and therefore in the foregoing analysis has many features of 
Trinitarian model, can hope to become more adequately Trinitarian with increasing 
empathy.  
 
A further point of interest concerning the overlaps in Fig 10 is their three-way nature. 
A two-way empathic relationship that ignores a third member is found in Fig 8 and it 
will be remembered that Burton found this essentially binary model unsatisfactory.  A 
reading of Fig 10 that takes the three-way nature of the overlap seriously will suggest 
that two-way empathy – between human and human or human and Divine persons - 
does not indicate Trinitarian pastoral care. In other words, that Burton was expressing 
a Trinitarian motivation in seeking to incorporate God in the pastoral counselling 
relationship (ref. Fig 9). 
 
So far I have spoken of empathy without defining it. It is important to realise that 
empathy is not an emotion (even while admitting that it is normally not devoid of 
emotion).139 It may be thought of as a form of resonance.140 A relationship in which 
both participants are aware of empathy is likely to have enjoyed mutual empathic 
listening at some point, defined as ‘active listening demanding an emotional 
investment in the other and relative openness to one’s own feelings’.141 The word 
empathy is, however, best defined in a motivational sense (se below).142 This is 
important, for it means that, given that we assume the participation of Godde in the 
pastoral care relationship the principle of empathy would act to maximise the degree 
of overlap between pastor and cared for in the area, not of feelings, but of shared 
motivations.  
 
A motive is usually broken down into two components – an internal drive that goads a 
person into action, and an internally judged goal or reward terminating the motive.143 
Of course both may well have been emotional in origin, which begins to suggest the 
complex relationship between motivation and emotion.  Describing empathy in 
motivational terms simply means that as a general principle, when the pastor is faced 
with a person who is feeling unwanted emotions, the principle of empathy will not be 
about sharing their feelings as about expanding their range of possible motivational 
outcomes. 
 
This further distances pastoral care from most non-directive counselling in that it 
accepts the influence of the pastor’s own motivations (as long as they empathise with 
Godde’s). To my mind this is in any case a more honest approach, for in my 
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experience the counsellor’s own world-view inevitably subtly influences the caring 
encounter – and therefore its outcome – no matter how non-directive the counsellor is 
aiming to be. 
 
To develop this a step further I suggest that the ideal motivation to pastoral care will 
be an entire empathic relating.  Empathic relating is ideally no more one-sided than 
encounter, as suggested in the following poem;  
 
 
The Counselling Encounter144 
 
He asked. 
He listened. 
He felt full Empathy. 
 
(But I didn’t know, 
as he never told me so.) 
 
 
This is not to imply that in pastoral care the pastor and cared for share themselves in 
equivalent manner. It is merely a departure from the popular notion that pastoral care 
is about (usually non-directive) counselling. It distances the two both through 
allowing the pastor to be pro-active in the relationship and by refusing the notion that 
they can be personally unchanged by the experience of care. 
 
This comes as no surprise, because it seems highly unlikely that Trinitarian policies, 
based on a model of God in which empathic sharing is constantly modified by 
unchanging difference-in-relationship,145 would prefer the cloning of only one 
expression of it. For example it seems likely that in practice there are variations in the 
quantity of verbal contributions different parties to the relationship make. This allows 
the giving of sermons to be situated within pastoral care, provided they are ‘empathic’ 
in line with the definition above.   
 
As a guiding principle the need to ensure the presence of empathy suggests we should 
maximise opportunities for natural empathy.146 This seems to me to have 
consequences for where pastors live and who pastors are, as well as supporting the 
current attitude to the use of role-play in pastoral formation. The latter is seen as an 
attempt to ‘get within that person’s frame of reference’ and so ‘provide valuable 
practice in empathetic understanding’.147   
 
On the question of where pastors should live I feel the principle of empathy 
recommends pastors to live near those they serve. Shared local experiences – be they 
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negative or positive – can be expected to support the pastor in the process of giving 
care. In those cases where the pastor could not reasonably be expected to live nearby 
the principle would work to encourage people to seek an improved environment as a 
matter of urgency.  Of course the variable of choice in where one lives will affect the 
ability of shared location to produce true empathy, though I suspect without reducing 
the opportunities for shared motivation to improve or maintain things. The option of 
genuine choice may even be of crucial importance to the incorporation of empathy in 
care.148  
 
On the question of who pastors are I suggest the principle of empathy recommends 
Christians try to ensure that in their pastorate as a whole there is natural empathy with 
all those to be served. By this I mean that it is not only drawn from a particular social 
category, and assumes the willingness to pool resources in the interests of the group 
task. On the smaller scale it would also recommend appointing mixed teams of 
individual pastors to mixed constituencies that between them are as far as possible 
representative of those they serve.  
 
Empowerment. 
 
For the third principle being drawn from Fig 10 I move beyond the contact 
(encounter) and overlap (empathy) of the shapes in the pattern to consider the overall 
effect of the figure and refer back to the discussion of a postmodern approach to 
language above. The pattern is shaping my thinking about Godde, and in the present 
context is influencing how I think and speak about pastoral care. It is having a 
powerful effect on this thesis. Its relationship with the paradigm of care I am pursing 
is not entirely dissimilar in manner of operation to the relationship of The Three with 
the world Godde has created and continues to create. Within a metaphysic of 
connection as proposed by Grey149 this simple model has power to contribute to the 
creation of new theological ‘alloys’. Even a simple, two-dimensional representation of 
Divine relations has creative power in the task of dealing with reality. In relational 
terms we are looking at a combination of relations that is empowering. 
 
This suggests that a hallmark of pastoral care will be that it produces a sense of being 
empowered to create something new. This is important for evaluation purposes. If 
what has been ‘achieved’ in the process of care cannot be articulated or demonstrated 
in some way the fact will cast doubt on whether the care has been truly pastoral. 
Conversely, if it can be demonstrated that care has enabled participants to the 
relationship to experience a change, in line with Divine aspirations, in the way they 
see and act in the world, then the care can be judged both pastoral and successful. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the principle of empowerment indicates that pastoral 
care must never be found disempowering people (e.g. by creating dependency upon 
the pastor, or requiring the cared for to tolerate an unjust situation). 
 
Empowerment can be defined as enabling people to act in line with their inner 
motivations, which introduces what I will call a Divine risk into the process. In the 
case of the most fiercely oppressed their motivations are likely to derive from the 
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need to survive.150 Whether oppressed or not, as we have seen, the operation of 
empathy in the relationship may be expected to influence the motivations involved. 
However in no case of Trinitarian care will it be possible for the pastor to control or 
pre-determine the motivational outcomes being enabled. The three-way relationship 
will be a kind of cauldron out of which unexpected  and truly creative results emerge.  
 
This lack of control may be actively resisted. Bishop Holloway writes, 
‘…change is painful and disorienting to most people, …[and is]… particularly 
resisted by those who derive some sort of privilege or power from the status quo.  
Sometimes this is an obvious an blatant refusal to share power and its benefits with 
some excluded group, such as Blacks in Apartheid South Africa or women in most 
human groupings up to and including the present day.  Those engaged in the 
rearguard action are rarely candid in their reasons for refusing to share power or lift 
restrictions from the subordinated group. [They] offer elaborate theoretical 
justifications for the maintenance of existing evils or the refusal to remove 
arbitrary restraints upon the freedom of others.’151 
 
And again, ‘Christian thinkers are still engaged in preserving unjust structures by 
theoretical arguments that justify them, but the theology is usually a cloak to cover a 
straightforward refusal to share power.  We have seen this phenomenon again and 
again in Christian history. The shorthand term for it is Original Sin’.152 
 
This leads me to pick up the idea of ‘sharing power’ and note that the empowerment 
in Trinitarian care will not be after the manner of levelling out the distribution of 
power, as will the idea of, say, sharing out a number of sweets between children. The 
natural, mutual, result of the caring encounter in Trinitarian mode will be not the  
sharing of some sort of limited commodity but the creation of additional, new power 
to do and be in the world.  As with the creative outcome of Trinitarian relations – 
Creation itself - the outcome of `Trinitarian pastoral care relations will be an 
outflowing of power to act and be in line with the shared motivations of all three 
participants in the relationship: pastor, those cared for, and Godde. 
 
Material realities and the question of balance. 
 
The three features described above occupy different ‘planes’ of material reality, 
involving all known modes of being in its practice. Encounter exists in the two planes 
of existence that together make up the kind of reality found in its most profound 
expression in the concept of the ‘sacramental’. It is something real and tangible and 
locatable within time and space, while at the same time dependent upon the presence 
of a kind of engagement that is not an automatic corollary of proximity. Encounter 
requires contact in an essential or material sense but is more than that for the physical 
component of the encounter must be received in a meaningful way to become 
encounter. Encounter is essential and quasi-sacramental. Empathy occupies a 
different category. It exists but cannot be pinned down to a specified location and has 
no material component.  Empathy is essentially existential, in the sense of being 
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concerned with especially human existence, freedom and individual responsibility, as 
defined above. Empowerment differs from both the above in that it is about action and 
change, movement and process.  
 
It is not difficult to see in these considerations an outline of different kinds of reality 
found in what we know of the three Persons of Godde, though it would be hard to pin 
each of the Three to merely one of the modes of being described.  This is not 
surprising, given that the Athanasian Creed teaches us their difference is relational, 
not substantial, and their inner life is forever a perichoretic dynamic of process 
displaying the ‘lure towards new patterns of connection’ described in Grey’s theology 
of God.153 The differences between these three kinds of reality might also have been 
likened to the differences between nouns (essential), adjectives (existential), and verbs 
(process) in philology.  Together these components comprise the metaphorical 
‘language’ of pastoral care policy being proposed.  
 
Before moving to an evaluation of my thesis there is one more factor that must be 
incorporated into the paradigm of care that has emerged. This is the factor of egality, 
discussed and proposed above in relation to the questions of hierarchy in Godde and 
shown to be not inconsistent with differences in authority within the relationship. If 
egality is re-imaged in terms of balance it can take my thesis beyond the proposal that 
Grey’s model of God translates into a paradigm of encounter, empathy and 
empowerment. It allows me to not only insist on the presence of all three before care 
can be termed pastoral but also to seek a balanced input of all three aspects. Again, 
this does not mean equivalence, but it does suggest that the pastor has no license to 
imagine that extra quantities of, say, encounter, will compensate for lack of empathy 
or empowerment in the relationship. This  might not only contribute to the task of 
planning and evaluating pastoral care but also be used by individual pastors to 
monitor their own practice. If they should begin to notice one or more of the three 
factors is missing from the service they offer it will alert them to a need to address the 
source of the distortion. 
 
 
*EVALUATION 
 
The overall claim of the foregoing analysis is that Trinitarian pastoral care will 
involve encounter, empathy and empowerment. This represents success in the task of 
teasing out a new paradigm for care from the material with which I have worked.  
However my claims must be regarded as provisional for several reasons.  One, as 
previously admitted, is the limitations embodied in the motivations that will have 
influenced the course of my reflection as a result of my own situatedness. Another is 
the possibly eisegetical nature154 of my engagement with others’ ideas: Browning’s 
understanding of correlative theology Stubbs’ description of postmodernism as it 
affects language, Grosz’s postmodern epistemology, the history and formulations of 
the orthodox Christian doctrine of the Trinity, Grey’s contemporary theology of ‘The 
Core of Our Desire’; Burton’s model of a re-imaged pastoral counselling in terms of 
Therapeutic Spiritual Direction and the psychotherapeutic concept employed by Bion 
and Foukes of projective identification. Yet another reason is the dynamism inherent 
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in the whole enterprise of applied theology in a world in which change is a 
fundamental feature of life. 
 
In choosing those elements of contemporary knowledge of Divine and human 
relationality that have been enabled to enter inter into dialogue here I have had to 
consider carefully what to include in and what exclude from the dialogue.  I suspect it 
would have been more intellectually satisfying, though emotionally less fulfilling, to 
reduce the number of the ‘colours’ in the collage. I retained them because I regard this 
topic as requiring this sort of breadth if it is to do justice to my concern to do theology 
with the Tradition that will resonate with contemporary experience. Drawing all the 
various influences together has been difficult, however, and I have been particularly 
conscious of the difficulty of knowing at which point to enter the circle of debate in 
each case. 
 
Use of the word ‘circle’ also indicates my awareness of the possibility that what has 
emerged may in fact have become a closed circle, the main feature of which is the 
exclusion of input that does not suit my thesis. Ultimately the perceived value of the 
model proposed may reasonably depend on the ideologies underpinning the means 
used for evaluating it. However, as my principle aim in considering the subject was to 
arrive at a model of care for my own use in my future role as Deacon this 
provisionality cannot be regarded as a weakness in the research. 
 
As was mentioned in the introduction, my paradigm might usefully be correlated with 
similar results from similar explorations based on different views of God. There is 
also the possibility that a possibly more independent evaluation might be made by 
research into the application of a paradigm of encounter-empathy-empowerment to 
the assessment of all human relationships (i.e. with others, with the rest of Creation, 
and with Godde.) 
 
 
 
 
*CONCLUSION 
 
In the Introduction to this thesis I first discussed the methodology being used and then 
described the contemporary postmodern epistemology and understanding of language 
being employed in the research, paying attention to feminist concerns. This provided a 
background for the examination of historical, philosophical and contemporary 
examinations of the relational aspects of the doctrine of the Trinity. The latter 
required definition of the concepts of perichoresis and hypostatic Personhood; and 
introduced Mary Grey’s theology of God. I eventually arrived at a working 
understanding of Godde as a Divine relational community comprising three inherently 
relational hypostases whom we tend to call and think of as ‘Persons’.  These Persons 
eternally exist together, interpenetrating and inter-relating in a non-dualistic co-equal, 
co-inherent participatory relationship that is transcendent and immanent, hierarchical 
and egalitarian.  
 
The discourse then turned to pay attention to human persons and relations in a way 
that revealed them to be generally more Godde-like than may be generally imagined, 
giving some evidence of a dynamic intra- and  inter-human relational identity and life 
similar to that seen in Godde. This lent weight to my thesis that it is valid to seek to 
correlate Divine and human inter-personal relations in the interests of applied 
theology, and led me to enquire into Burton’s diagrammatic representation of the 
human relationship of pastoral counselling. Allowing this model to dialogue with my 
previous epistemologically- and traditionally-informed diagrammatic representation 
of Grey’s ‘God’ became the basis for the latter section of the discourse, which 
constituted a search for clues as to nature and quality of a care relationship modelled 
on Godde.  
 
Concentrating and reflecting on the portrayal of divine relationships in Fig 10 I 
arrived at three crucial features of Divine inter-Personal relating - those of encounter, 
empathy and empowerment. The remaining discussion involved suggestions 
concerning how these features might prove useful policy guides in the planning and 
delivery of pastoral care.  It was further noted that these factors span the known 
categories of material reality and that doctrinal knowledge of the operation of 
Trinitarian relations suggests all known categories are present in Godde. A final point 
was that the model seems to require all three features to be present in a way that 
appears ‘balanced’ if pastoral care is to be deemed truly Trinitarian. The conclusions 
of the research can be represented in Fig 11 below, which is a representation of the 
proposed contemporary paradigm for Trinitarian pastoral care that has been my chief 
conclusion as a result of this research: 
 
 
 
          
                               Encounter 
 
      
Fig 11. Contemporary 
paradigm for 
Trinitarian pastoral 
care. 
 
 
 
I am satisfied that the research has produced an ‘alloy’ that I will find personally 
useful as a guide to my own practice as a Deacon in future years.  I feel it might also 
prove useful to inter-faith studies interested in correlating understandings of pastoral 
care informed by different theologies.  Finally, I suggest it might usefully inform the 
practice of all human care, and perhaps all human relating, not those relationships that 
we like to define as pastoral. 
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